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Preface
For many years I have been concerned with the process by which scientists turn arithmetic into understanding. The word "process" here is meant in at least four different senses at the same time -algebraic, logical, cognitive, social. These correspond to at least four different disciplines that have hitherto considered parts of the puzzle in isolation, and so my arguments will jump back and forth among these four ways of speaking. There seems to be no standard name for this nexus in the literature of any of the fields that touch on it, and in the 20 or so years that I've been watching closely, as far as I know no popular book or scholarly monograph has appeared that focuses on these topics at any level. That this book has materialized in your lap in some copyrighted form (codex, Kindle, netbook, whatever) is evidence that editors and reviewers believe the gap to have been worth filling.
Before I was trying to consider these issues all together, I was trying to think them through separately. Over 35 years as a professional statistician and biometrician I have been employed to transform arithmetic into understanding in five main areas of scientific application: first, craniofacial biology, then gross neuroanatomy (the National Institutes of Health's "Human Brain Project"), then image-based anatomy of the whole organism (NIH's "Visible Human Project"), and, most recently, physical anthropology and organismal theoretical biology. Along the way there have been diversions: the science of fetal alcohol damage, analysis of war wounds to the heart, studies of hominid fossils. But I suspect nowadays that this material may be crucial to a broader range of applications than just those I've threaded it through personally. Likewise, the methodology seems richer and potentially more fruitful than any single scholar could oversee. It is time to weave the arguments together into a focused and coherent narrative capable of seeding further developments leveraging the efforts of others, not just me.
The volume you hold is not a scholarly monograph in the strict sense, an argument about one thing (a mono-graph), but instead an essay of somewhat experimental structure offering a set of core arguments drawn from interpretations of an idiosyncratic selection of main readings. This structure is different from all my earlier books but is in line with a spate of recent essays, for instance, Bookstein (2009a,b,c; 2013a,b aimed at the less narrowly disciplinary reader. So the spirit of the expositions here is considerably less formal than the material being exposited. The first public presentations of these ideas outside of a classroom came at the conference "Measuring Biology" hosted by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Altenberg, Austria, in 2008. (There is a review of the historical context of this conference in Appendix 2.B of Chapter 2.) Reactions of the people in the room to my argument were reassuring. Perhaps, I thought, the time had come to transport the argument out of its previous niche of course syllabus or colloquium presentations for delivery in the larger arena of printed dissemination, where a broader spectrum of colleagues and browsers might provide thoughtful, searching commentaries.
In this repackaged version the argument seems not to face much competition. It puzzles me that hardly any scholars pursuing social studies of science are looking at this arena. The formulas accompanying this topic are technically difficult from time to time, that is true, but never as hard as, say, philosophy of physics. Rather, they are constructively demanding in ways that only an insufficiently wise or overly strategic graduate student in science studies would choose to circumvent. It may also be the case that those aspects of science studies are most interesting to one's colleagues in science studies just where Nature or Clio is mumbling incomprehensibly, not, as in many of the examples here, where her message is clear and unequivocal. Still, whatever the reason, issues at the foundations of quantitative reasoning inhabit a true lacuna everywhere (except in the physical sciences, where things are too simple, owing to the miracle of exact laws).
In short, I think a book like this one is obviously needed, enough that I'm surprised nobody has written one before this. Readers of course decide things like this (the obviousness of the need, I mean) for themselves. For that frame of mind to be suitable, among its core stances should be one sketched effectively by University of Michigan philosopher Jack Meiland 30 years ago under the suggestively simplistic rubric of "college thinking." College thinking entails a constant concern for why one adopts the inferential heuristics and shortcuts one adopts: why one believes what one believes, why one reasons as one does, how one justifies one's own logical conclusions to oneself prior (it is hoped) to justifying them to others. In the area of "applied probability" this has been the concern of generations of cognitive scientists, with a Nobel Prize for one of them, Daniel Kahneman; but over here, where we deal with inferences about scientific claims rather than singular human decisions, there seems to be no matching literature at all.
At the core of scientific methodology have always lain concerns like these about the validity of empirical inferences. The subtype that is inference from quantitative data, our topic in this book, is easier to manage than the general case, yet serves to illustrate most of the themes from the broader context. Its study can never be begun too early, nor can students ever be trained to be too skeptical. Evidently the essential iconoclasm of topics like mine -the continual interruption of one's colleagues' arguments by the repeated challenge "Just why do you believe that that claim follows from your data, and how are the opposing or competing claims impeached?" -is ill-suited to the Intro. modal scientific article, as it requires threading across multiple exemplars. You don't win points from the anthropological reviewer, for instance, when you note that the way you are managing an inference in hominid evolution is exactly the same as the way somebody from the other side of campus handled an inference in the ecology of urban agriculture a couple of years back. Your reviewer cares only about anthropology, more's the pity. Then the issue of how numbers persuade independent of discipline is not a reasonable candidate for a peer-reviewed article in any of the disciplines so benefited. There remains mainly the possibility of a book-length argument like this one that claims citizenship in no field except its own. Compare Nassim Taleb's 2008 bestseller The Black Swan, likewise a book of applied quantitative reasoning (and likewise concerned with heuristics and their biases). I don't write as wittily as Taleb, whom I would like to meet some day, but the breadths of our nonoverlapping magisteria (his in finance and the madness of crowds, mine in the comparative natural sciences) seem to be commensurate. This is not a book of "statistical methods," then, but instead a complement, or perhaps an antidote, to the whole shelfful of those. Most of the books on that shelf don't tell you where the numbers that are the objects of algebraic manipulation by the formulas there originated. Consider, for instance, the otherwise superb textbook Statistics by the late David Freedman and colleagues, the book we in Seattle use for our undergraduate service course -it never breathes a single hint about any of the rhetorics here at all. There are nevertheless some domains that, out of necessity or perhaps just by virtue of the vicissitudes of intellectual history, manifest a real concern for the empirical origin of the quantities on which further reasoning is based. The list of such fields includes epidemiology (Rothman et al., 2008) , "multivariate calibration" (Martens and Naes, 1989) , and observational astronomy (Harwit, 1981) . In contrast, our topic is related only tangentially to a burgeoning scholarly literature on causation; see, for example, Pearl But, in general, explicit discussions at adequate length of crucial issues in the rhetoric of quantitative inference are quite rare. Null-hypothesis statistical significance testing, by contrast, though appallingly widely known, is no kind of substitute argument at all, and is dismissed quite rudely throughout this volume, especially at Section L4.3.4, except for examples where the null is actually true.
The sociologist and methodologist Otis Dudley Duncan (1984), setting out a curriculum for applications of a similar rhetoric to a neighboring area, describes the strategy as one of "beads on a string . . . or perhaps nuts in a fruitcake." Regardless of the spatial/culinary metaphor, we can agree that our field is not "foundations of statistics," nor "foundations of metrology," nor philosophy of science per se. It is instead a collection of interrelated tropes, insights, and exemplars that I believe cumulate to an argument worth making independent of any intellectual or academic specialization. The text here does not require any subject-area knowledge by way of prerequisite. The puzzler page of Saturday Review, a once-popular American literary magazine, used to describe its most enthusiastic participants as having minds "wellfurnished but not overstuffed," meaning widely read in the public arguments (mainly, but not entirely, political or aesthetic) of the past and present, but not pedantic on any single issue in particular; the same would apply to my intended reader. It would be helpful if you were sturdily independent of mind, at least outside of mathematics and physics, and if you had at least a mild curiosity for history of ideas and at least a modest acquaintance with some of the major ironies of philosophy of science as expressed in the 14 epigraphs to follow. A few of the examples in the book are practical enough that personal circumstances might be among the factors motivating a closer reading of these sections than others -sharing air with a smoker (Section 4.6), drinking alcohol during a pregnancy (Section 7.7), living in Seattle in an inadequately buttressed building (Section 3.3). Parts of this text will be within the reach of the good (meaning curious and open-minded, but also skeptical) high school student. Other fragments are appropriate for an undergraduate, and still others are appropriate as part of the catechism that is a doctoral dissertation defense. Few will find all of this easy going, but every reader should be able to follow the main line of argument at some level of engagement.
There are many diagrams here, some mine and some the original authors', some about facts and some about formulas. There are also many equations, perhaps more than some readers would like but none that are not mandated by the exposition in their vicinity. Part of my theme is that the formalisms of mathematics, even if they were your béte noire in the course of high school or college algebra or calculus, have by now become your friendly guide in exploring these domains of applied epistemology of science. A prior course in probability theory is not a disadvantage. A prior course in statistics probably is a disadvantage, as my views both contradict most of what you are likely to have been taught there and emphasize issues, like where measurements come from, that are not generally part of the syllabus of courses Preface xxiii like those, but that end up framing those other syllabi in rather unfavorable terms. The better your grade in that introductory statistics course, the more you will need to unlearn.
The material here is flexible enough for more than one pedagogical context. I have used it as part of the core of a liberal arts education (College Honors program, University of Michigan, 1986 Michigan, -2004 , as part of a graduate program in the life sciences (University of Vienna, from 2004 on), as part of an upperclass undergraduate course in linear modeling for applied mathematics and statistics majors (University of Washington, 2011), and as part of the freshman induction/indoctrination into the idea of college (University of Washington, 2007 Washington, -2013 . The graduate students work over the more advanced tools and the more complex examples of Part III along with discipline-customized versions of the forward-looking prophecies in Chapter 8. For American undergraduates, a semester's course on these principles can draw entirely from Chapters 1 through 4. Yet when Parts III and IV are included these same lectures and readings drive a sophisticated version of the same material at Vienna that challenges biology students right up through the predoctoral year.
Although I have never taught in a philosophy department, or in a science studies program for that matter, I suspect that the applied epistemology of numbers may likewise be a useful venue for introducing both the philosophy of science and the study of its social/cognitive aspects in general. Perhaps, in spite of what Platt avers (Section 3.4) about "mathematical" versus "logical" boxes, this is the tamest part of empirical scientific reasoning, the part that looks like physics in a particularly crucial cognitive aspect: it uses not the number line but real paper or real space as the sandbox for exploring forms of empirical understanding and modeling.
Thanks I am grateful to all the authors and institutions who granted me permission to reproduce their graphical materials as part of this new text. To the best of our ability, specific acknowledgments according with the copyright owners' requirements are conveyed caption by caption.
The entire manuscript of this book was closely read in an earlier draft by my colleagues Clive Bowman (London, England) and Hermann Prossinger (Vienna, Austria), and it is far better by virtue of their efforts. I also thank three anonymous reviewers for the publisher and the gentle but principled editing of Lauren Cowles. Whatever solecisms, eccentricities, blunders, and gaps of logic or philosophy remain are, of course, entirely my own fault.
Many of the readings that underlie this syllabus were called to my attention by others. I'd welcome suggested additional or alternate readings and reinterpretations from any reader of this book. Please send your suggestions along with any other comments to flbookst@uw.edu or fred.bookstein@univie.ac.at.
Preparation of a "big book," even though a matter of a myriad of details over the year or so prior to publication, is otherwise a background task running over decades during which one's job is always to be doing something else. I am grateful for readers
